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GIVING NOTICE: AN ARGUMENT FOR
NOTIFICATION OF PUTATIVE PLAINTIFFS
IN COMPLEX LITIGATION
Marjorie A. Silver*
Abstract Professor Silver advocates recognition of an inherent judicial power to send or
authorize notice of pending litigation to potentially interested persons with unfiled claims.
Recognizing such a judicial power is consistent with recent legal developments establish-
ing a role for judges in expediting and managing federal litigation. Although the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure bnly explicitly provide for notice to potential parties in Rule 23
class action litigation, Professor Silver demonstrates that a more general judicial power to
notify putative plaintiffs is consistent with the federal rules and the Constitution. She also
shows that first amendment values support a judicial role in providing notice. Finally, the
judiciary's role in protecting the disadvantaged, the public interest in private actions aris-
ing from mass torts and other collective actions, and the conservation of both public and
private resources resulting from case consolidation, justify the federal district court's
inherent power to send or authorize notice to putative plaintiffs.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Improved access to the federal courts was an inevitable result of the
relaxed pleading requirements and other simplified procedures of the
1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the swell of litigation that
followed precipitated a demand for reforms to stem the perceived
glut.1 Recent amendments to the Rules have incorporated managerial
techniques designed to make litigation more efficient, to discourage the
filing of spurious claims, and to force parties whose use of judicial
process is excessive to bear the burden of their adversaries' costs and
attorneys' fees.2
In many respects, the current Rules have failed to reconcile access
and efficiency. The 1983 amendments to Rule 11, for example, while
* Associate Professor of Law, Touro Law Center. B.A. 1970, Brandeis University; J.D.
1973, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank Professors Aleta Estreicher, David
Luban, Ed Purcell, Gene Shreve, and Jeff Stempel for their helpful input on a draft of this
Article. I also thank members of the faculties at the University of Bridgeport, University of
Maryland, and Touro Law Schools for their perceptive and probing questions and comments.
Susan Davis, Dorothea Lockhart, Brenna Mahoney, Bill Mills and Diana Sheffield rendered
valuable research assistance. A New York Law School faculty research grant funded work on
this Article.
1. The advent of the Federal Rules, while significant, see Resnil, Failing Faith. Adjudicatory
Procedure in Decine4 53 U. CH. L. REv. 494, 494-95 (1986), was not the sole precipitant of the
increase in federal litigation; congressional and judicial creation of new federal rights was also an
important factor. See Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for
Minorities; 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 341, 350 (1990).
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26.
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demanding competency and thoroughness of preparation from (pri-
marily) plaintiffs, also discourage filing marginal claims, many of
which are public law, and frequently civil rights claims. Thus, what
the rules give with one hand-access-they take away with another-
sanctions.
Not every expansion of access, however, is incompatible with the
streamlining of litigation. Although the bench and bar have devoted a
great deal of energy to handling previously filed multijurisdiction,
multiparty, primarily mass tort claims, they have paid comparatively
little attention to facilitating the efficient disposition of unfiled, yet
mature, claims.' Empowering federal district court judges to send or
authorize notice to non-parties with such potential claims would
enhance the opportunities to adjudicate all interests and rights stem-
ming from one mass tort or act of discrimination. Neither the rules
nor any statute nor any judicial authority has given federal trial court
judges explicit, plenary authority to notify, or authorize notice to,
potential plaintiffs of pending lawsuits. Whether such power exists at
all is controversial. The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue
in a suit arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).5
This Article analyzes the legal arguments and policies implicated in
the notice question and offers a resolution endorsing such power. Part
II describes the controversy over the existence of judicial power to
notify putative plaintiffs of pending litigation. It also examines the
issue of notice raised in opt-in class litigation6 brought under the
ADEA and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the Court's
resolution of that issue in Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling.7 Part
III discusses both the relevance of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to the analysis of the notice question, and the emerging role of
federal trial judges as case managers. Parts IV and V explore the rele-
vance of due process and Article III, respectively, to judicially sanc-
tioned notice to putative parties. Part VI advances a first amendment
approach to the notice question. Finally, Part VII confronts the ten-
3. See Yamamoto, supra note 1, at 363.
4. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text and note 141.
5. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989). The Court relied largely on
the special characteristics of the ADEA class action as implied congressional sanction for judicial
authorization of notice in this context. See id. at 486-87; see also text accompanying notes
48-49.
6. An "opt-in" class is one in which potential plaintiffs must affirmatively consent to join the
class, in contrast with a Rule 23(b) class, in which one must affirmatively "opt-out" in order to
avoid class membership. See infra notes 20-21.
7. 110 S. Ct. 482.
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sion between the underlying assumptions of our adversary system on
one hand, and public policy considerations on the other, and provides
a justification for a broad interpretation of the judge's inherent power
to notify potential plaintiffs of pending litigation.
II. NOTICE AND CONTEMPORARY COMPLEX
LITIGATION
A. Two Short Stories of Judge-Initiated and Judge-Facilitated
Notice
In 1974, a plane manufactured by McDonnell Douglas crashed near
Paris, France, killing all 350 or so people on board. At least ten
actions filed around the country were consolidated in the Central Dis-
trict of California before Judge Pierson Hall. Judge Hall informed
counsel that he intended to order McDonnell Douglas to furnish him
with a list of passengers and the names and addresses of their next of
kin so that he could notify interested persons of the actions pending
before him. McDonnell Douglas refused and sought mandamus from
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
In 1985, Hoffmann-La Roche laid off some 1200 workers. A
number of those affected organized as R.A.D.A.R. (Roche Age Dis-
criminatees Asking Redress) and filed an ADEA suit against Hoff-
mann-La Roche in federal district court. R.A.D.A.R. moved for
discovery of the names and addresses of all similarly situated employ-
ees. Hoffmann-La Roche opposed the discovery.9
B. Notice, the Adversary System, Justice and Expedience
Our system of jurisprudence has evolved from the traditional model
of the trial court as a passive neutral, "an umpire blandly calling balls
and strikes for adversaries appearing before it."' Perhaps we have
less faith than we once had in our adversary system, and in the ability
8. See Pan Am. World Airways v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975).
9. Sperling 110 S. Ct. at 485.
10. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Conm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 620
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); see also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1286 (1976) ("The judge was a neutral umpire, charged
with little or no responsibility for the factual aspects of the case or for shaping and organizing the
litigation for trial."); Frankel, The Adversary Judge, 54 Tax. L. REv. 465, 468 (1976), cited in
Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400, 402 (1978);
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 1906 A.B.A.
Address, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 281 (1964) ("[l]n America we take it as a matter of course
that a judge should be a mere umpire, to pass upon objections and hold counsel to the rules of the
game, and that the parties should fight out their own game in their own way without judicial
interference.").
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of opposing lawyers to litigate zealously on behalf of their clients, pro-
moting, if not insuring, the emergence of Truth and Justice. The trial
judge is no longer solely reactive, subject only to the initiatives and
whims of counsel. Today the federal judge actively oversees the man-
agement of litigation crowding the docket.'" Mass disasters like Bho-
pal and toxic torts like asbestos challenge the judicial system's ability
to provide responsive remedies. The consolidation and coordination
of cases by the Panel for Multidistrict Litigation, 2 the promulgation
of two editions of the Manual for Complex Litigation,'3 numerous
recent reports, recommendations and studies, 4 as well as recent legis-
lative initiatives, 5 evidence the need to deal more effectively with the
range and quantity of litigation on the federal district docket. Fur-
thermore, inequality of skill and resources among litigants and their
counsel invite judicial intervention to even the odds.
Judicially-facilitated notice to persons with ripe yet unfiled claims
increases the opportunity for cost-effective consolidation and disposi-
tion of related cases. It also enhances access to the courts for those
who might otherwise forgo available avenues of redress. Federal Rule
11. See infra text accompanying notes 76-79.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988) (providing for multidistrict consolidation of pretrial
proceedings for civil actions raising common questions of fact).
13. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (1973) [hereinafter MCL]; MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D (1985) [hereinafter MCL 2D]. In fact, the original MCL, preceded by
the HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES, 25
F.R.D. 351 (1960), was revised and supplemented several times before the promulgation of the
MCL 2D. See MCL 2D at 1-2, nn.2-3; see also Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 404 (advocating
managerial approach of the MCL be adopted for general civil case management).
14. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT (April 2, 1990) [hereinafter
FCSC Report]; ABA Comm'n On Mass Torts, Report to the House of Delegates (1989) (not
adopted at February 1990, ABA House of Delegates meeting); COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1990); Discussion of Complex Litigation Project, 1989 A.L.I. PROC. 357,
357-99 (66th Annual Mtg.); Report on the Project on Complex Litigation, 1987 A.L.I. PROC. 74,
74-86 (64th Annual Mtg.); ALI, REPORT: PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMPLEX LITIGATION
(Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 1987). The Federal Courts Study Committee's report contains
numerous recommendations for decreasing the workload of the federal courts; the other reports
address multi-party, multi-district litigation in particular.
15. See, eg., S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S414 (Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990) (providing for statutorily-mandated case management) (revised as S. 2648, giving
individual districts latitude to devise appropriate judicial management); H.R. 3406, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess., 136 CONG. RC. H3116 (Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1990) (a revision
of H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H4232 (Court Reform and Access to
Justice Act of 1988) relaxing diversity requirements and facilitating consolidation of tort cases
involving 25 or more claimants). None of these measures has yet become law. Congress did pass
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, signed into law on
December 1, 1990. It implements some of the FCSC Report recommendations, see supra note
14, including the provisions for removal of separate and independent claims (§ 312), relaxation of
supplemental jurisdiction requirements (§ 310), and changes of venue (§ 311).
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of Civil Procedure 23 explicitly empowers and frequently requires"
the court to notify absent class members.17 But the rules do not
directly address whether that same court has the power to notify puta-
tive plaintiffs of pending litigation other than that classified as a Rule
23 class action.'" Does the judge nevertheless have such power? The
question has important implications for a variety of complex litiga-
tion.' 9  It has arisen frequently in cases brought under the opt-in class
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides in part: "In any class action maintained under
subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort."
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) provides:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders
... (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to~some
or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or
of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action
18. See Chayes, supra note 10, at 1292 ("The class action is only one mechanism for
presenting group interests for adjudication, and the same basic questions will arise in a number of
more familiar litigating contexts.").
Traditionally, mass torts have been deemed inappropriate for class-action treatment under
Rule 23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's notes (1966) ("A 'mass accident' resulting
in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the
likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability,
would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways."). There is, however, a growing
trend to certify mass tort litigation as Rule 23 class actions. See, ag., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880
F.2d 709, 734 (4th Cir.) (upholding class certification of Dalkon Shield plaintiffs and noting that
the opinion of the 1966 Advisory Committee has yielded to the growth of mass products tort
claims and increasing favor of the use of Rule 23(b)(3) for such cases), cert denied, 110 S. CL 377
(1989); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008-11 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 852
(1986); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Despite this
trend, some courts continue to find Rule 23 inappropriate for addressing certain mass torts. See,
ag., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983). These mass tort cases would not be covered by the
notice provisions of Rule 23. See also . Resnik, From. Cases to Litigation (draft June 5, 1990)
(forthcoming in 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. - (1991)) (discussing controversy over
application of Rule 23 and other aggregative techniques to mass torts).
19. See, ag., Pan Am. World Airways v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.
1975) (reversing district court's decision to notify next of kin of deceased passengers); see also
Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962) (holding it inappropriate at
preliminary stage of litigation to authorize notification to absent class members in spurious class
action). There are, however, few reported decisions addressing the notice question apart from
the ADEA and FLSA cases. See infra notes 20-21.
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provisions of the FLSA20 and ADEA.2 1 Courts that have not
approved such notice have offered a variety of reasons: the lack of
explicit authority to do so;22 the inappropriateness of rousing "sleep-
ing plaintiffs;"23 and concerns regarding overzealousness, champerty
and barratry on the part of the bar.24 Courts that have authorized
20. Section 16(b) of the FLSA was amended in 1988 to read:
An action to recover the liability prescribed... may be maintained against any employer...
by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the
court in which such action is brought.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988); see, eg., United States v. Cook, 795 F.2d 987, 993-94 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(allowing discovery of putative plaintiffs in FLSA action); Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725
F.2d 1263, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 1984) (disallowing notice); Partlow v. Jewish Orphans' Home of
Southern Cal. 645 F.2d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1981) (allowing corrective notice only); Braunstein v.
Eastern Photographic Laboratories, 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944
(1979) (allowing notice); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1977) (pro-
scribing court-sanctioned notice).
There is a consensus among the circuit courts that an action brought under the opt-in proce-
dures of the FLSA (as well as the ADEA) is not a Rule 23 class action, but is governed, rather,
by the rules set forth in the statute itself. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211,
1213 (8th Cir. 1984); Dolan, 725 F.2d at 1267; Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578,
579 (7th Cir. 1982); Partlow, 645 F.2d at 758; LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286,
288-89 (5th Cir. 1975). The Court did not address this issue in Hoffman-La Roche v. Sperling,
110 S. Ct. 482 (1989), but one might infer its agreement from its failure to discuss Rule 23. But
see Shushan v. University of Colorado at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 267-68 (D. Colo. 1990)
(concluding that after Sperling, courts should use procedures embodied in Rule 23 for ADEA
actions because they "are designed to promote effective management, prevent potential abuse,
and protect the rights of all parties").
There is some dispute as to whether an opt-in class action is a class action at all, or rather a
permissive joinder. Compare, eg., Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 92-93 (D.N.J. 1983)
(certifying class action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) with, eg., Held v. National R.R. Passen-
ger Corp., 101 F.R.D. 420, 421 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding ADEA action may not be maintained as
class action). See Spahn, Resurrecting the Spurious Class Opting-in to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act & The Equal Pay Act Through the Fair Labor Standards Act, 71 GEo. L.J. 119,
122, 132-33 (1982) (arguing that class action device, albeit opt-in, is essential for ADEA enforce-
ment). Whether an action is treated as a class as opposed to a permissive joinder has important
implications for purposes of jurisdiction and the statute of limitations. Spahn, supra, at 132.
Spahn argues that notice to potential plaintiffs should be mandatory in opt-in class actions in
order to effectuate the Acts' purposes. Id. at 140. See also Comment, The Class Action Suit
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Current Status, Controversies, and Suggested
Clarifications, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1377, 1388 n.73 (1981) (identifying cases treating 16(b) actions
as joinder devices).
21. Section 7(b) of the ADEA incorporates the enforcement procedures of the FLSA,
including the opt-in procedures of § 216(b). See, e.g., Sperling v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 862
F.2d 439, 447 (1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989) (allowing notice in ADEA action); McKenna,
747 F.2d at 1214 (not allowing notice); Woods, 686 F.2d at 579-82 (allowing plaintiffs' counsel,
not court, to send notice).
22. See, e.g., Pan Am World Airways, 523 F.2d at 1077 n.3.
23. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., McKenna, 747 F.2d at 1217 ("An invitation from counsel to particular plaintiffs
to join a particular lawsuit is potentially a champertous communication."). "Champerty" is the
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notice have emphasized the absence of specific prohibition,25 the inher-
ent power of the federal judiciary to manage its caseload,2" the effi-
ciency and economics of case consolidation,27 and the furtherance of
various statutory policies through notice.2 8
C. The Pre- Sperling Cases
Because the FLSA and, by incorporation, the ADEA provide that
class actions may only be maintained on behalf of employees who have
affirmatively consented to join,29 many courts have grappled with
plaintiffs' requests for both discovery of identities of possible class
members and notice to such persons of the pendency of the putative
collective action. Not surprisingly, defendants in these actions have
vigorously opposed such efforts. The various courts of appeals that
have addressed this controversy have produced widely differing
responses. These range from outright endorsement of the district
practice whereby one with no personal interest in a dispute undertakes litigation at his own
expense with the promise from the interested party of some share of the recovery. See Peck v.
Heurich, 167 U.S. 624, 632 (1897) (quoting the lower court's opinion, 6 App. D.C. 273, 283-84
(1895): "We must regard an agreement by any attorney to undertake the conduct of a litigation
on his own account, to pay the costs and expenses thereof, and to receive as his compensation a
portion of the proceeds of the recovery, or of the thing in dispute, as obnoxious to the law against
champerty"). "Barratry" is the offense of stirring up litigation, W. GILmER, JR., THE LAW
DIcTIONARY 42 (6th ed. 1986), or the process of repeatedly engaging in champerty, In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 425 n.15 (1978).
25. Woods, 686 F.2d at 581 (approving notice by plaintiff, but not by court); see also Pan Am.
World Airway, 523 F.2d at 1082 (Schnacke, J., dissenting) ("The question is not whether some
rule permits the action proposed, but whether any rule, statute, or logical concept forbids it.").
26. See, eg., Woods 686 F.2d at 580; see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31
(1961) ("The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been
considered an 'inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases."); In re Air Crash Disaster on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1012-16 (5th
Cir. 1977) (court's inherent managerial power allows it to require consolidation, designate lead
counsel and reallocate attorneys' fees, despite counsel's objections); Miller, Problems of Giving
Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 328 (1973) ("Basically Rule 23(d)(2) is a catch-all and
merely codifies the inherent judicial power to give notice to absent parties whenever the court
deems it advisable to do so."); cf In Re Air Crash Disaster, 476 F. Supp. 445, 451 (1979)
(Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation) (finding Panel had no authority to notify potential
plaintiffs of pending litigation, and suggesting that any such request be directed to district judge).
27. See, eg., Pan Am. World Airways 523 F.2d at 1082 (Schnacke, J., dissenting); Allen v.
Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.RD. 438, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F.
Supp. 957, 960 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (consolidation of all cases will result in more efficient
disposition of claims).
28. See, eg., Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.
1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 93 (D.N.J. 1983)
(notice furthers remedial purposes of ADEA and avoids multiplicity of suits).
29. See supra notes 20-21.
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court's power to issue notice, 0 to allowing discovery from defendants
to facilitate notice,31 to prohibiting the district court from issuing
notice itself while allowing it to approve notice issued by plaintiff or
his counsel,32 to allowing notice as long as plaintiff does not enlist the
district court's help either in obtaining the identities of putative class
members or in sending notice,3 3 to prohibiting plaintiff's lawyer from
issuing notice, 34 although plaintiff himself may be able to do so,35 to
prohibiting notice altogether.36 Such was the confused state of the law
until the Supreme Court entered the fray in Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.
V. Sperling.37
D. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling
After Hoffmann-La Roche ordered a reduction in force of some
1200 workers in 1985, Richard Sperling filed a complaint with the
EEOC under the ADEA on behalf of himself and all similarly situated
employees of Hoffmann-La Roche.38 With the assistance of counsel,
Sperling and some of his fellow employees formed Roche Age Dis-
crirninatees Asking Redress (R.A.D.A.R.). Using R.A.D.A.R.'s let-
terhead, they sent notice to some 600 employees they believed were
adversely affected on the basis of age by the Hoffmann-La Roche lay-
off. The letter invited its recipients to join planned litigation by
returning a signed consent form. Plaintiffs sought the completed
forms in order to fulfill the statutory requirement that each member
joining in an ADEA class action submit consent in writing.39
When the members of R.A.D.A.R. filed suit in federal district
court, they submitted over 400 signed consent forms received in
30. Braunstein, 600 F.2d at 336.
31. United States v. Cook, 795 F.2d 987, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
32. Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1982).
33. Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 1984).
34. McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1214-17 (8th Cir. 1984).
35. Id. at 1217 (McMillian, J., concurring); see also Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d
859, 860 (9th Cir. 1977).
36. Kinney Shoe Corp., 564 F.2d at 863. The court did not, however, rule out the possibility
that discovery of potential plaintiffs might nonetheless be permissible, and remanded that
question to the district court. Id. at 864; see also Partlow v. Jewish Orphans' Home of Southern
Cal., Inc., 645 F.2d 757, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1981). While following the rule in Kinney, however,
the Partlow court allowed notice for purposes of informing previously notified persons of the
invalidity of their filed consent forms. Id. at 759.
37. 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989).
38. Id. at 485. Apparently, the EEOC did not act on the complaint, and plaintiff fulfilled the
requisite administrative filing requirements to enable him to file the ensuing ADEA lawsuit. See
Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 392, 395-96 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 862 F.2d 439 (3d
Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989).
39. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. at 485.
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response to the mailing. To insure that all affected employees had
received notice, plaintiffs sought discovery of the names and addresses
of all similarly-situated employees, and asked the district judge to send
notice to all affected employees who had not yet submitted consent
forms. Hoffmann-La Roche resisted both motions, and cross-moved
to have the court declare invalid the consents already received. The
district court denied Hoffmann-La Roche's motion and ordered it to
comply with the discovery request. The court further authorized
plaintiffs to send court-approved notice to all employees who had not
yet consented to join the suit, asserting that it was appropriate for the
trial court to facilitate notice to potential class members in an ADEA
action as long as the communication made clear that the court took no
position on the merits of the claim.' On interlocutory appeal, the
circuit court upheld the authority of the district court to facilitate
notice.41
Justice Kennedy, writing for seven members of the Court,4 2 agreed
with the lower courts. The majority reasoned that because Congress
explicitly provided for collective suits in the ADEA, it must have
intended the trial judge to possess the requisite procedural and mana-
gerial powers to insure that such suits proceed efficiently, at least to
the extent that such powers are not inconsistent with the federal
rules.43 These powers include allowing appropriate discovery to ascer-
tain the identities of putative class members, as well as the power to
authorize appropriate notice to such persons. The Court noted the
value of the collective action device-it allows victims of age discrimi-
nation to pool their resources and thus incur lower individual costs in
pursuing redress. It also benefits the judicial system by affording reso-
lution in a single proceeding of multiple disputes arising from the same
alleged discriminatory activity.'
The Court recognized that the virtue of court oversight of notice
sent in Rule 23 class actions,45 namely insuring that counsel refrain
from inappropriate communications, exists in the ADEA situation as
well.' The Court reasoned that because judicial involvement is inevi-
table in an ADEA collective suit, it is better that such involvement
40. Id.
41. Id. at 486 ('T]here is no legal impediment to court-authorized notice in an appropriate
case." (quoting 862 F.2d 439, 447 (3d Cir. 1988)).
42. Justices Scalia and Rehnquist dissented. Id at 488-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. Id at 486.
44. Id
45. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981) (affirming duty and authority of
district court to oversee counsel's conduct in Rule 23 class action).
46. 110 S. Ct. at 486-87.
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begin early and that it not depend on the initiative of counsel or litigat-
ing parties.47
Rather than viewing the federal rules as a general source of author-
ity for the trial court's exercise of discretion, the Court stated that
"[i]n the context of the explicit statutory direction of a single ADEA
action for multiple ADEA plaintiffs, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provide further support for the trial court's authority to facilitate
notice."48 The Court identified both Rules 83 and 16(b) as furnishing
this support. Rule 83 provides, in relevant part: "In all cases not pro-
vided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any
manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in
which they act."49 Rule 16 authorizes the trial court to enter schedul-
ing orders and to address the need for any special procedures if the
case before the court is complex. 0 The Court failed, however, to
explain any special relevance of the ADEA's statutory scheme to the
rules on which the court relied.
The Court further rejected Hoffmann-La Roche's argument that the
legislative history surrounding the 1947 amendments to the FLSA,
known as the Portal-to-Portal Act,5 reveals Congress's intent to
decrease the burden imposed on employers by the collective action
device. 2 The legislative history of the FLSA, wrote the majority,
47. Id. at 487 ("The court is not limited to passive waiting for objections about the manner in
which the consents were obtained."). The Court went on to say that "[c]ourt authorization of
notice serves the legitimate goal of avoiding a multiplicity of duplicative suits and setting cut-off
dates to expedite disposition of the action." Id.
48. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b), 16(c)(10).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1988).
52. 110 S. Ct. at 488. As the Court noted, the legislative history of the Act indicates that the
principal procedural purpose of the Portal-to-Portal Act was to prohibit representative-as
opposed to collective--actions. Prior to the amendment, persons not members of the affected
classes could bring actions on behalf of the class. Concerned that this was creating opportunities
for abuse, Congress prohibited such representative actions, but preserved the collective action, or
opt-in class approach. Id. The Court cited 93 CONG. REc. 538, 2182 (March 18, 1947) (remarks
of Sen. Donnell), distinguishing collective actions from representative suits, the latter still
authorized by the FLSA:
But the second class of cases, namely cases in which an outsider, perhaps someone who is
desirous of stirring up litigation without being an employee at all, is permitted to be the
plaintiff in the case, may result in very decidedly unwholesome champertous situations
which we think should not be permitted under the law.
See also United States v. Cook, 795 F.2d 987, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Nonetheless, some lower courts had interpreted the legislative history behind the Portal-to-
Portal Act as evidence of congressional intent to remove courts from active participation in class
actions under the FLSA, and concluded that the district courts thus had no power to notify
putative plaintiffs. See, e.g., Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir.
1984).
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must be interpreted in light of congressional intent that "[tihe broad
remedial goal of the statute should be enforced to the full extent of its
terms.
, 53
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Renquist, dissented, maintain-
ing that the exercise of case management powers in this case was "not
at all designed to facilitate the adjudication of any claim before the
court.""M Justice Kennedy focused on the question of whether the dis-
trict court's management responsibilities and authority included facili-
tating discovery of the identities of, and notice to, additional parties. 5
Justice Scalia, however, observed that the absent persons to whom
notice was sent were not parties. 56  Under the ADEA the absent per-
sons could not be parties until they had affirmatively consented to join
the action. Justice Scalia explained that if they were not parties, they
were not participants in any case or controversy before the court, and
therefore the court was powerless to communicate with them.5 7 Thus
he found the majority's decision to allow discovery of the identities of
putative plaintiffs and approval of notice to them to be inconsistent
with the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 111.58
Scalia acknowledged that Congress could give an executive agency
the authority to demand from an employer the identities of persons
allegedly affected by the employer's discriminatory action, that the
agency could furnish plaintiffs' counsel with such a list, and that coun-
sel might then notify such persons of pending litigation in which they
might join.59 He deemed this, however, to be irrelevant to the court's
assertion of such power, which, "if not unconstitutional, [is] at least so
out of accord with age-old practices that surely it should not be assumed
unless it has been clearly conferred."' Scalia found no such explicit
expression of authority in either section 16(b) of the FLSA, or in the
53. 110 S. Ct. at 488.
54. Id. at 488-89 (emphasis in original).
55. Id at 486.
56. Id. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Id. Justice Scalia's assertions about the limited power of Article III judges are not easily
reconciled with the majority decision he joined in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), making
not merely notice to potentially affected persons, but actual participation and agreement by such
persons, the linchpin for a nonimpeachable consent decree. Id at 765; see infira note 82. In fact,
as one of my colleagues has observed, the one unifying thread is the Justice's apparent opposition
to the assertion of discrimination claims. Letter from Jeffrey Stempel to Marjorie Silver (Sept.
10, 1990) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
58. 110 S. Ct. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Id
60. Id (emphasis added).
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federal rules. 6  He drew a clear distinction between the trial court's
powers and responsibilities as to absent parties in a Rule 23 class
action, and its responsibilities toward the "members of the public at
large" such as those to whom the Sperling district judge approved
notice.' While acknowledging the validity of the majority's desire to
facilitate the adjudication of cases not yet filed,63 Scalia admonished
that "[t]he problem is that it is a justification in policy but not in
law."'6
The central problem with the majority's opinion is that it implies
that judicial power to notify depends on the legal basis for the claim.
The Sperling decision suggests that it is the nature of the FLSA/
ADEA scheme, rather than inherent judicial power, that empowers
the trial court to notify putative plaintiffs. The power to issue notice
does not come from the statute at all; at best the ADEA is neutral,
neither endorsing nor prohibiting collective actions brought by actual
members of the class. 65 The Court need not look to Congress to find
authority to send or authorize notice. It is the judiciary's responsibil-
61. Id. at 490-91. Justice Scalia not only derided the majority's interpretation of Rule 83, id
at 491 ("The Court's repeated reliance upon Rule 83 is so strained that it snaps."), he argued that
to allow the solicitation of persons who have not themselves presented a claim to the court
violates Rule 82, which provides that the Rules "shall not be construed to extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein." Id. at 490. Rule
82, however, does no more here than state the constitutionally obvious: only Congress,
circumscribed by Article III, can extend the courts' jurisdiction. See Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv.
L. REv. 356, 399 (1967) ("'Jurisdiction' here means subject matter jurisdiction, and in this
respect rule 82 may describe an inherent limitation on the rulemaking power.").
Justice Scalia also argued that the trial court's discovery order was invalid as it was not issued
for a purpose allowed by Rule 26. 110 S. Ct. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. 110 S. Ct. at 490 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia apparently ignored the fact that,
despite the distinction between the Rule 23 "opt-out" class and the § 16(b) "opt-in" class, both
are nonetheless class actions, and thus it follows that if the district court has notification power
under Rule 23, it should as well under § 16(b): a notified individual is not conclusively a party
until that person exercises his discretion either to not opt-out, under Rule 23, or to opt-in under
Rule 16. Scalia's arguments, if they have force at all, do so in regard to the authority of judges in
non-class complex litigation to notify those "members of the public at large" who may have
particular interest in the pending litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee's
notes (1966) ("Notice is available fundamentally 'for the protection of the members of the class
or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action' and should not be used merely as a device for the
undesirable solicitation of claims." (citations omitted)). Even so, any distinction between class
actions and large joinders for purposes of notice is largely artificial, and the due process
distinction based on res judicata, see infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text, is unsatisfactory.
63. 110 S. Ct. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I concede that this justification, at least, is
entirely valid.").
64. Id.
65. Scalia correctly observes that were the statute silent with respect to the class issue,
plaintiffs could have brought a class action even without the consent of other members of the
class. Id. at 489.
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ity as the countermajoritarian branch of government to empower the
disempowered 66 The power to send notice of pending litigation to
those often unaware of their legal rights is implicit in the court's role
as guardian of the underrepresented.67 Justice Scalia errs in conclud-
ing that because no explicit mandate exists for the assertion of what he
characterizes as the extraordinary power to facilitate notice to poten-
tial plaintiffs,6" such power does not exist. I submit that it does, that it
is not extraordinary, and that it is not limited to class actions, whether
arising under Rule 23 or elsewhere.
III. NOTIFICATION UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
The second sentence of the first Federal Rule of Civil Procedure,
unchanged since its promulgation in 1938, provides that the rules
"shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
ruination of every action."69 The rules create procedures consistent
with and in furtherance of this exhortation. Is this goal to be con-
strued to apply only to parties who present themselves to the court, or
does it extend to others having the same rights as the plaintiffs who
have filed the litigation? Despite numerous substantive revisions, the
rules remain silent about notice to putative plaintiffs.70 The import of
this silence is controversial. Some courts have concluded that the
absence of a specific prescription in the rules is fatal to a request for
notice.71 Nonetheless, the purpose of the rules as originally enacted,
66. See, eg., Yamamoto, supra note 1, at 417-18 (criticizing diminished access to courts in
view of the need for judicial zealousness in protecting minority rights due to their lack of
meaningful protection by political branches of government).
67. See infra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
68. See 110 S. Ct. at 488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
70. The exception is, of course, Rule 23's provisions for notice with respect to class actions.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), 23(d)(2).
71. In Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.
1975), for example, the majority rejected the district court's assertion of power to discover and
notify putative plaintiffs, after marching through each of the rules arguably relevant to the notice
question. The case grew from lawsuits precipitated by two airline disasters. In one of the suits,
at least ten different actions had been filed around the country, all of which were consolidated by
the Panel of Multidistrict Litigation before Judge Peirson Hall of the Central District of
California. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Defendants sought and obtained
mandamus to challenge Judge Hall's order to produce a list of passengers and their next of kin.
525 F.2d at 1075.
Rule 1, said the court, dictates how the other rules are to be interpreted, but does not itself
allow a court to create new rules of procedure. Iad at 1078. Rule 16 sets forth the trial judge's
power to conduct pretrial conferences, but does not authorize notice to others. Id. Rule 19,
which provides for joinder of necessary parties, was inapplicable as the district court judge did
not purport to join the persons he sought to notify, and furthermore there was no dispute that
complete relief could not be accorded among the current parties to the dispute. Ia Rule 83 was
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and as subsequently amended, comports with this Article's position
that because such notice is nowhere expressly forbidden, the decision
to issue notice is within the inherent residual discretion of the trial
judge.
In 1966, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)(2) was amended to
empower the district judge to:
[M]ake appropriate orders.., requiring, for the protection of the mem-
bers of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that
notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of
the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they con-
sider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present
claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action ....
inapplicable because notification to potential plaintiffs was not authorized by any rule, and, said
the majority, "a procedure that deviates so sharply from the traditional role of the judiciary
cannot be justified as an ad hoc rule of practice." Id.
The court found arguments concerning authorization of notice based on Rules 21, 23, and 42
somewhat more "forceful." Id. Although one of the consolidated actions was styled as a class
action, id. at 1075, the court held that Rule 23 did not authorize notice prior to class
certification:
The admitted purpose of the notice in this case is to bring the claims of unnamed members
of the plaintiff class before the court. Notice for this purpose usually has been thought to
issue only after certification of a class action. Otherwise, by notice and joinder of unnamed
members of a possible plaintiff class, a district court could circumvent Rule 23 by creating a
mass of joined claims that resembles a class action but fails to satisfy the requirements of the
rule.
Id. at 1079 (citations omitted). The court stopped short of asserting that pre-certification notice
was never proper: "I do not pass upon the district court's power to issue pre-certification notice
beyond stating that if available, it does not extend to this case." Id at 1079 n.6.
Rule 21 (Misjoinder and Non-Joinder of Parties), according to the court, although a facilitator
ofjoinder under Rule 20 (Permissive Joinder of Parties), did not authorize massive notice, which,
if successful, would "effectively transform the present action into an unwieldy pseudo-class-
action not authorized by Rule 23." Id. at 1079-80. "Rules 20 and 21 cannot be read to circum-
vent the requirements of that rule." Id. at 1080. Judge Hufstedler, concurring specially, added
that Rule 20 was "inapplicable because none of these nonparties is presently asserting any right
to relief." Id. at 1082. Finally, the court held that Rule 42 only allowed for consolidation of
cases already filed. Id. Thus the court concluded that because none of the federal rules explicitly
authorized notice, the district court had exceeded its powers in its efforts to notify putative plain-
tiffs.
The dissent, in contrast, asserted that because no provision of the rules or other law forbids
courts from sending the kind of notice that Judge Hall sought to send, he had the authority to do
so. Id. at 1082 (Schnacke, J., dissenting).
See also Kaplan, supra note 61, at 365-66 (suggesting that under the indispensable parties
provisions in Rule 19 "[i]t is not improper, and may make good sense, for a party or the court to
notify the absentee informally of the pendency of the action so that he may consider what to
do.").
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Arguably, this provision merely codifies the district court's inherent
power to issue notice in Rule 23 and non-Rule 23 litigation alike.72
Admittedly, the evidence that this was its explicit intent is inconclu-
sive.7 3 Although the purpose of Rule 23(d)(2) is to endorse the trial
court's discretion regarding notice,74 the purpose of such notice is
principally to protect the due process interests of class members.75
Nonetheless, legitimating notice for purposes other than due process
in no way clashes with the policies underlying Rule 23.
Recent amendments to the federal rules affirmatively support the
view that notice in complex litigation furthers the current rules' poli-
cies. The 1983 amendments to Rules 11, 16 and 26 focused the powers
and responsibilities of the federal trial judge on the active management
of each case.76 Rule 11 increased the pre-filing responsibilities of the
litigants and their counsel. Rule 16 was transformed into an active
case management tool. Although the previous rule had helped to dis-
pose of cases more efficiently, the amended rule explicitly obliged the
district court to manage the litigation, as well as facilitate settlement.77
Similarly, the amendments to Rule 26 governing discovery empowered
the trial court to prescribe reasonable limits on discovery, whether or
not requested by counsel.78 The amendments strengthened all three of
72. See Miller, supra note 26, at 328.
73. For example, the FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee notes (1966) caution that
notice "not be used merely as a device for the undesirable solicitation of claims."
74. See id ("Rule 23(d)(2) does not require notice at any stage, but rather calls attention to
its availability and invokes the court's discretion").
75. Id. (CThis mandatory notice [for 23(b)(3) class actions] pursuant to subdivision (c)(2),
together with any discretionary notice which the court may find it advisable to give under
subdivision (d)(2), is designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action
procedure is of course subject."); see Miller v. Chinchilla Group, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 411, 416-17
(S.D. Iowa 1975) (denying class action notification and ordering notice to absent purported class
members to protect their interests).
76. See A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTrIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 2,
22, 30 (1984) (remarks at Federal Judicial Center Workshop) (discussing how amendments to
Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26 represent an integrated package).
77. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's notes (1983) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted):
In many respects, the [old] rule has been a success. For example, there is evidence that
pretrial conferences may improve the quality of justice rendered in the federal courts by
sharpening the preparation and presentation of cases, tending to eliminate trial surprise, and
improving, as well as facilitating, the settlement process. However, in other respects
particularly with regard to case management, the rule has not always been as helpful as it
might have been. Thus there has been a widespread feeling that amendment is necessary to
encourage pretrial management that meets the needs of modern litigation.
78. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (1983):
The amendment.., is designed to encourage district judges to identify instances of needless
discovery and to limit the use of the various discovery devices accordingly .... [The
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these rules by empowering the judge to impose sanctions for the rules'
violations. Nor is the court's power merely reactive. Under Rules 11,
16, and 26, a judge may impose sanctions upon a party and that
party's lawyer upon motion by opposing counsel or the court's own
initiative.79
These amendments to the rules reflected as much as precipitated
developments in the role of the trial judge. Responding to the swell of
complex litigation, courts have reexamined and frequently redefined
their participation in litigation. 0 The promulgation of the MCL rep-
resents one attempt to guide district judges through the thorny thick-
ets of complicated litigation.81 Yet the manual, too, is silent about
notifying putative plaintiffs of pending litigation outside the class
action context.82
Although the Rules fail to resolve the question of the trial court's
power to notify putative plaintiffs, they suggest a mood consonant
with this power. Congress has yet to clarify the court's authority to
issue notice. As discussed below, however, rather than interposing
obstacles to judicially approved notice, the Constitution permits, if not
actually compels, the trial court's exercise of authority to notify absent
persons of pending litigation.
IV. NOTIFICATION AND DUE PROCESS
The primary rationale for the notice requirement in Rule 23 is due
process. A true class action will bind all members in the class, barring
them from bringing actions to litigate the adjudicated claims. While
some actions brought under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) by their nature
amendment to 26(b)] is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying
and discouraging discovery overuse.
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26. The purpose of imposing sanctions even without any party
initiative is stated in the 1983 advisory committee's notes to Rule 11: "Authority to [impose
sanctions sua sponte] has been made explicit in order to overcome the traditional reluctance of
courts to intervene unless requested by one of the parties."
80. See, eg., Chayes, supra note 10, at 1302 ("The judge is not passive, his function limited to
analysis and statement of governing rules; he is active, with responsibility not only for credible
fact evaluation but for organizing and shaping the litigation to ensure a just and viable
outcome."); see also Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376, 379 (1982) (cautioning
that new management responsibilities of district judges-especially those pretrial-may lead to
judicial control at other phases of the litigation).
81. See MCL, supra note 13, at v-viii.
82. In fact, the first edition of the MCL encouraged district courts to adopt local rules
requiring judicial preclearance of all communications between counsel and absent class members.
MCL, supra note 13, at § 1.41. After the Court's decision in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S.
89 (1981), the MCL was revised to omit this provision. See MCL 2D, supra note 13.
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require class treatment,83 others, such as those brought under 23(b)(3),
often are class actions only because the named plaintiffs have styled
them as such, and because the court has certified that they meet
requirements of commonality and adequacy of representation, and
that the class action is a better method than any other alternative8 4
Those notified are afforded the opportunity to "opt-out" of the class.
If they do, they may bring their own causes of action, intervene in the
current action, or do nothing.8" The failure to opt-out, however, binds
them to the ultimate results of the class action. Thus due process
requires that all members of a class in an opt-out class action receive
adequate notice of their rights and responsibilities.86
In contrast, the opt-in class action judgment binds only those who
have affirmatively consented to join the class. Because potential class
members will only be bound by the judgment if they affirmatively
83. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee notes (giving examples of Rule 23(b)(1) & (2)
class actions, eg., suits brought to abate a nuisance, to have a corporation declare a dividend, or
to enjoin a racially-segregated school system).
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's notes (1966):
In the situations to which this subdivision relates, class-action treatment is not as clearly
called for as in those described above, but it may nevertheless be convenient and desirable
depending upon the particular facts. Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a
class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity
of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or
bringing about other undesirable results.
85. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2), providing that:
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the member from the
class if [the member] so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does
not request exclusion may, if [the member] desires, enter an appearance through... counsel.
86. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (due
process requires reasonable notice under the circumstances in order for a judgment to be binding
on class).
In its 1989 Spring term, the Court issued a number of opinions assaulting formerly settled civil
rights doctrine. One of these, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), affirmed the rights of
disaffected white firefighters to collaterally attack a consent decree resolving discrimination
charges against black firefighters in the city of Birmingham, Alabama. Due process, claimed
Justice Rehnquist for the 5-4 majority, prohibited binding persons who had not participated in
the former litigation to a resultant consent decree, regardless of whether they had been given the
opportunity to intervene. Congress then attempted to legislatively overrule Wilks, by providing
that third parties who receive notice of the proposed consent decree and have a reasonable
opportunity to present objections to it, or whose interests were otherwise adequately represented,
will be unable to collaterally attack any consent decree rendered. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. § 6, 136 CONG. Rac. H364 (Civil Rights Act of 1990); S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6,
136 CONG. Rac. S991 (Civil Rights Act of 1990); H.R. 1, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 6, 137 CONG.
REc. E33 (Civil Rights Act of 1991). The bill also provides that it is not intended to deny any
person of due process of law. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 6(m)(2)(D). Despite this provision, the
constitutionality of such legislation, if it becomes law, is likely to be challenged. Nevertheless,
such notice is an appropriate response to reconcile the competing interests of eradicating
discrimination and protecting the perhaps inchoate process rights of affected nonparties.
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agreed to join, lack of notice to them of the pending action does not
offend due process. They stand in virtually the same position for pur-
poses of preclusion as one who had the opportunity to intervene as a
party in a pending suit but chose not to.87 Thus the fourteenth and
fifth amendments provide no resolution of the notice question for cases
not covered by Rule 23, be they opt-in class actions, mass joinders, or
other sorts of complex litigation. 8
V. NOTIFICATION AND ARTICLE III
In his Sperling dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's
decision violated Article III of the Constitution. 9 He asserted that a
court has no power to act beyond the confines of specific cases or con-
troversies. Members of the public at large who might have an interest
in a pending lawsuit, unlike absent class action parties, are none of the
court's business.'
Justice Scalia stopped short of asserting that authority to issue
notice would violate Article III if Congress were to provide for it
87. See FED. R. CIv. P. 24 (Intervention). A putative plaintiff who declined to participate
would not be bound by a decision in favor of the defendant; however, it is unlikely she would be
able to rely on offensive collateral estoppel should plaintiffs prevail. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979) (offensive collateral estoppel not appropriate, where party
relying on it had opportunity to join in first litigation and chose not to).
88. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1213 (8th Cir. 1984)
(distinguishing Rule 23 notice by due process concerns); Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic
Laboratories, 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979) (affirming
court's power to issue notice while acknowledging no violation of due process); Kinney Shoe
Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1977); Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28,
29-30 (E.D. La. 1975) (distinguishing Rule 23 notice by due process concerns).
89. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482, 489-90 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 490. Justice Scalia reached deeply into history to support his assertion that a court
is acting on something other than a "case or controversy" when it sends notice to persons who
might be interested in joining pending litigation. He attempted to build his argument solely on
late-eighteenth through early-twentieth century jurisprudence. See, eg., Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911) (Congress violated Article III by conferring power on Court to
pass on constitutionality of legislation in absence of case or controversy); Osborn v. Bank of
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824) (Article III "power is capable of acting only
when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.
It then becomes a case."). These cases, however, only address the court's powers over
adjudication. The notification of absent persons regarding litigation currently pending before the
court is not adjudication with respect to the rights of those persons, although it may precipitate
their participation in an ongoing case or controversy currently before the court. See Pan Am.
World Airways v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 1975) (Schnacke, J.,
dissenting) ("[Majority insists that the] intended notice to potential plaintiffs is process of some
sort. Clearly, it is not. The notice brings in no new parties, imposes no burdens and affords no
rights. The recipients of the notice are completely free to disregard it."). Thus not only does
Justice Scalia ignore Supreme Court separation of powers doctrine since 1911, see infra note 97
and accompanying text, his historical approach fails to justify his conclusions.
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explicitly.91 What he did say, however, is reminiscent of the so-called
"clear statement doctrine" invoked by the Court from time to time,
often to sidestep the resolution of constitutional questions:9 2 unless
specifically authorized by Congress, courts are not to presume so
extraordinary a power.93
Justice Scalia's concern about the scope of Article III is unfounded.
Our judiciary possesses numerous powers that are collateral to its role
as adjudicator of cases and controversies. Some of these are expressly
granted; others are implicit. The power to promulgate procedural
rules, for example, is an explicit collateral power.94 The power to help
formulate sentencing guidelines is another.9" The power to hold an
91. 110 S. Ct. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia does not go so far as to state that
an Article III problem would exist even were Congress-or the Court through the
congressionally approved federal Rules-to confer such power on the district courts. This is,
perhaps, a begrudging acknowledgement that his views on separation of powers are discordant
with those of the Court's majority generally on this topic. Given the rather strict constructionist
view of separation of powers Justice Scalia articulated in his dissenting opinions in Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, L, dissenting), and given his comfort with departing from precedent, see,
e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2756 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
previous Court decisions striking down patronage-based employment decisions should be
overruled); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064-67 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (advocating that the Court explicitly
overrule Roe v. Wade), he may very well insist, should such a case come before him, that
congressionally-mandated power to notify nonparties violates Article III. His would
undoubtedly be a minority view.
92. See, e-g., Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
645 (1980) (refusing to assume agency had authority to regulate nonsignificant risks of leukemia
in absence of clear statutory mandate); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) (despite
broad delegation of power, Court will not infer that Congress intended to grant Secretary of State
authority to withhold passports based on a citizen's associations or beliefs); see also Note, Intent,
Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95
HARv. L. REv. 892, 909 (1982) (application of the clear statement doctrine "can postpone the
day of constitutional reckoning for collisions between individual rights and congressional power
by truncating statutes before they enter the zone of constitutional challenge").
93. 110 S. Ct. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 60.
94. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2072 (1988); FED. R. Cv. P. 83.
95. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388-89 (1989):
Our approach to other nonadjudicatory activities that Congress has vested either in federal
courts or in auxiliary bodies with the Judicial Branch has been identical to our approach to
judicial rulemaking: consistent with the separation of powers, Congress may delegate to the
Judicial Branch nonadjudicatory functions that do not trench upon the prerogatives of
another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary ....
[A]lIthough the judicial power of the United States is limited by express provision of Article
III to "Cases" and "Controversies," we have never held, and have clearly disavowed in
practice, that the Constitution prohibits Congress from assigning to courts or auxiliary
bodies within the Judicial Branch administrative or rulemaking duties that, in the words of
Chief Justice Marshall, are "necessary and proper.., for carrying into execution all the
judgments which the judicial department has the power to pronounce." Wayman v.
Southard, 10 Wheat., at 22.
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attorney in contempt is implicit. 96 None of these "non-judicial" func-
tions encroaches upon the essential functions of either of the other two
branches of government. Thus their constitutionality is consistent
with the Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence.9 7
The difficult question is not whether the power to notify potential
parties conforms to Article III. Rather, the real issue is whether the
power to do so is inherent in the judicial function, rendering the need
for explicit authorization unnecessary. 98  I suggest that not only is
such power implicit, the denial of that power threatens to trample first
amendment rights.
VI. NOTICE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Recent Supreme Court decisions have largely eradicated the taboos
regarding professional advertisement and solicitation. What was once
deemed not only unprofessional but also unethical, and thus subject to
sanctions,99 has since become not only permissible but consistent with
See also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680-81 (1988) (upholding provisions of Ethics in
Government Act vesting in federal court miscellaneous powers with respect to independent
counsel).
96. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987)
(court's inherent power to initiate contempt proceedings includes authority to appoint private
attorney as prosecutor); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) (courts have
inherent power to compel compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt).
97. See, eg., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382 (concerns of "encroachment and aggrandizement...
ha[ve] animated our separation-of-powers jurisprudence and aroused our vigilance against the
'hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its
power' " (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)). Compare Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951
(striking down legislative veto) and Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982) (striking down exercise of Article III powers by Article I bankruptcy judge)
with Mistretta 488 U.S. 361 (upholding constitutionality of federal sentencing guidelines) and
Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (upholding constitutionality of judicial appointment of independent
counsel) and Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (upholding
agency power to adjudicate state-law counterclaims).
98. Compare Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[W]e
should require more than the generalities of Rule 83 or the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to
conclude that a federal judge, whose authority is confined by Article III of the Constitution to
the exercise of the judicial power of the United States, may communicate with nonparties in this
way.") with Pan Am. World Airways v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir.
1975) (Schnacke, J., dissenting) (asserting that relevant inquiry is not whether any law or rule
permits notice, but whether any forbids it).
99. See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 41-43 (1976). Auerbach tells how the ABA
canons fostered the interests of established corporate lawyers who had the luxury of sitting in
their offices and waiting for clients to come to them, at the expense of
the new-immigrant neophyte in a large city where restricted firms monopolized the most
lucrative business and thousands of attorneys scrambled for a share of the remainder ....
The Canons, reflecting values appropriate to a small town, were easily adaptable to an
equally homogeneous upper-class metropolitan constitutency, where they served as a club
against lawyers whose clients were excluded from that culture: especially the urban poor,
Notification of Putative Plaintiffs
our evolving concept of first amendment protection of commercial
speech."0 0 Lawyers, like cleaners, decorators, or banks, may advertise
their services in order to attract customers, albeit subject to reasonable
regulation. 101 Lawyers may now advertise their specializations,1 2 as
well as the fees they charge for particular services. 103 They may also
target their advertisements toward persons known to have specific
needs for these services."° Furthermore, in class action litigation,
courts cannot prohibit truthful communications between class repre-
sentatives or their attorneys and absent members of the class.105
Because of the first amendment protection accorded commercial
speech,10 6 states generally may not discipline professionals !or issuing
truthful and nondeceptive written communications. 7 Given such
developments, it is hardly surprising that the defendant in Sperling did
new immigrants, and blue-collar workers. These lawyers confronted problems of client
procurement which an established corporate practioner did not experience.
Id at 42.
100. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363-65 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
101. See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281, 2293
(1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); In re R1M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
102. Peel, 110 S. Ct. 2281.
103. Bates, 433 U.S. at 367-79.
104. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 473-78 (1988).
105. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1981) (overruling trial court's order,
based on MCL § 1.41, requiring pre-clearance of communications between counsel and absent
class members). The original MCL § 1.41, supra note 13, which has no counterpart in MCL 2d,
provided as follows:
1.41 Preventing Potential Abuse of Class Actions:
[I]t is recommended that each court adopt a local rule forbidding unapproved direct or
indirect written and oral communications by formal parties or their counsel with potential
and actual class members who are not formal parties, provided that such proposed written
communications submitted to and approved by order of court may be distributed to the
parties or parties designated or described in the court order of approval.
106. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
107. See, eg., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985)
(government may not ban "truthful and nondeceptive advertising simply to spare itself the
trouble of distinguishing such advertising from false or deceptive advertising"); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (restrictions on professional advertising may be no broader than what is
reasonably necessary to prevent deception).
The Court has carefully distinguished written solicitations from in person solicitations, and
has so far only accorded first amendment protection to the former. Compare Shapero, 486 U.S.
466 (affirming attorneys' rights to mail targeted solicitations) and Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626
(striking down Ohio's prophylactic prohibition against use of legal advice and information in
attorney advertising) with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding
prohibition against in-person solicitation).
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not dispute the right of plaintiffs' counsel to solicit the consent of puta-
tive members of the opt-in class by mail. 08
The rationale for first amendment protection of commercial speech
emphasizes the interests of those on the receiving end of the communi-
cation." 9 In the attorney advertising cases in particular, the Court
has noted the prospective client's interest in knowing the nature and
cost of the legal services available, especially at a time when the client
may be faced with a particular legal problem. 1"'
If a putative plaintiff has a cognizable interest in receiving informa-
tion that an attorney desires to send, then arguably that interest exists
whether or not the attorney wants to send the information and
whether or not it is the attorney who does the sending.111 Thus any
answer to the question of whether judges have the inherent power to
issue notice must consider the rights of potential plaintiffs to receive
108. Brief for Petitioner at 40, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989) (No.
88-1203); see Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 1984)
(acknowledging right of plaintiffs and counsel, without judicial assistance, to communicate with
putative plaintiffs). In fact, a major thrust of defendant's argument was that the Sperling
plaintiffs had already sent mailings to some 600 employees, had obtained the consent of 400 of
them, and thus there was no need for the court to take the extraordinary step of sending notice
under its imprimatur. See Sperling v. Hoffinann-La Roche, Inc., 862 F.2d 439, 447-48 (3d Cir.
1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989).
109. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) ('The listener's interest is
substantial: the consumer's concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far
keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue.... [S]uch speech serves ... interests in
assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking."); Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 763-65 (first
amendment protection applies to recipients of commercial information). The Court has
articulated this right to receive information in other first amendment contexts as well. See, eg.,
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (right of listeners paramount over
rights of broadcasters); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (right to receive
birth control information protected by first amendment).
110. See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473-74 (1988) ("[T]he First Amendment does not permit
a ban on certain speech merely because it is more efficient; the State may not constitutionally ban
a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to those whom it would most interest is
somehow inherently objectionable.").
111. New York has recently joined Texas, Florida, North Carolina and Virginia in
promulgating rules regulating the sealing of court records upon request of counsel. The New
York rule prohibits sealing absent a judicial finding of good cause, and empowers the court to
notify third parties and give them an opportunity to be heard on a sealing motion. Wise, Court
Rule Adopted on Sealing Records, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1991, at 1, col. 5. For one judge's opinion
that the public has important interests in knowing what goes on in private litigation that
seriously affects persons other than those who are parties to the litigation, and that judges should
perhaps be empowered to reveal such information, see Forer, When Should Judges Be Whistle
Blowers?, 27 JUDGES' J. 5, 7-9 (1988).
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such information.11 2 Despite, if not because of, the lack of any clear
congressional or constitutional direction as to the existence and extent
of the judiciary's right to impart information, and especially informa-
tion which undoubtedly would be beneficial to the recipient," 3 first
amendment values support the judge's power to notify putative
plaintiffs.
The first amendment implications of the notice question warrant a
variation on the clear statement doctrine approach.114 If neither Con-
gress nor the Court through its rulemaking function has specifically
prohibited the court's issuance or approval of notice, courts should
presume that such communications are permitted. Absent a clear pro-
scription to the contrary, doubts ought be resolved in favor of
speech. 15 Justice Scalia had it backwards. 6 What is extraordinary
is not that courts presume such power in the absence of positive nor-
mative direction. Given the first amendment values involved, what is
112. See Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979) (affirming power of district judge to issue notice, supported in
part by "recent trend in the law" acknowledging attorneys' first amendment right to advertise).
What of the judge's first amendment rights? The judge's verbal and written expression, like
that of the lawyer, is subject to reasonable regulation. For example, the judge's position warrants
that she refrain from using words that manifest bias or prejudice, Model Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 3(B)(5) (1990); that she not comment publicly on cases pending before her that
might affect the proceeding's fairness, id. Canon 3(B)(9); that she disassociate herself from
"membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, or national origin," id, Canon 2(C); and that, when a candidate for judicial office, she
shall not make speeches addressing political or legal issues that are likely to come before the
court, *i& Canon 5(A)(3)(d). Some judges argue that the latter is an overly broad restriction on
their first amendment rights. London, For Want of Recognition, Chief Justice is Ousted, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 1990, at B16, col. 3. I have searched in vain for cases addressing the judge's
protected right to freedom of expression. Nonetheless, one ought not dismiss out of hand any
suggestion that the judge, even within her instititutional role, has certain first amendment rights.
Cf United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444,457 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub
nor., Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990) (acknowledging, yet rejecting, first
amendment claims of city councilmen asserted as defense to contempt citation issued for their
refusal to comply with court decree).
113. Regardless of whether the recipient consents to join the litigation, he is in a more
advantageous position having received a presumably accurate, non-coercive, and informational
communication than he otherwise would be.
114. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
115. Because no branch of government has explicitly prohibited notice, this case is easily
distinguished from Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), which upheld the CIA's
agreement with Snepp requiring him to submit any proposed publications for prior review. Id at
509 n.3. I take no position here on whether Congress or the Court could, consistent with the first
amendment, prohibit courts from notifying putative plaintiffs, other than to note that it is a
legitimate question. See, eg., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 598,
603-05 (1982) (striking down Massachusetts statute requiring closing of courtroom to public or
press during testimony of minor sexual offense victim, holding that first amendment embraces a
right of access to criminal trials to ensure informed discussion of governmental affairs).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
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extraordinary is the resistance of the bench and bar to the notion that
notice lies within the court's inherent power.
Furthermore, given that plaintiffs and their attorneys have first
amendment rights to solicit consent from potential plaintiffs, it is pref-
erable for the court to maintain some control over the process,
whether the notice goes out under plaintiffs' or counsel's signature as
approved by the court, or whether the court itself sends the notice.
The court can diminish lingering concerns about attorney overzealous-
ness and misrepresentation, and can neutralize any tendency of the
notice to suggest some judgment on the merits of the lawsuit. 117 The
court can further insure that the recipient of the notice is aware of the
option to employ counsel of his or her own choice.'
1 8
To be sure, the court's desire to notify putative plaintiffs may not be
entirely neutral. For reasons of efficiency and finality the court may
117. See, e.g., Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 442 (N.D. IlM. 1982) (judicially
supervised notice assures neutral discussion of the action and potential plaintiffs' rights of
participation).
118. In Sperling v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 392, 416 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd, 862
F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989), the notice authorized by the trial court
contained the following:
"YOUR LEGAL REPRESENTATION IF YOU JOIN. If you choose to join this suit,
your interest will be represented by the named plaintiffs through their attorneys, as counsel
for the class."
The notion that recipients of such notice must either accept named plaintiffs' counsel, or
forego the opportunity to join the lawsuit is troubling, and other courts allowing notice have
made clear that recipients may employ counsel of their choice. See, e.g., the notice approved by
the court in Allen, 93 F.R.D. at 447 app. A:
Your Options As To Legal Representation If You Join The Suit. If you wish to join the suit
as a party plaintiff, it is entirely your own decision as to whether you prefer to be repre-
sented by the present plaintiffs' attorneys or by an attorney of your own choosing.
Accord, Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 957, 961, 966 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
Rule 23(c)(2) expressly provides that the notice sent to absent class members in a (b)(3) action
must apprise them that they have the right to appear through counsel of their own choice. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) ("[A]ny member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an
appearance through his counsel."). There is some question as to the scope of such an appear-
ance, however. See Kaplan, supra note 61, at 392 n.137:
I read this "appearance" as entitling counsel to receive the papers in the action to enable
him to follow the case with a view to deciding, e.g., whether he should move to intervene. If
"appearance" is read as enabling the class member to be admitted automatically into the
action as a party, it would stand in odd contrast to intervention in the action under Rule 24,
which is not automatic and requires a showing .... Until experience accumulates, it may be
advisable to set out in the (c)(2) notice to the class the rights which the court proposes to
allow to "appearing" members.
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court addressed the specifics of the notice
authorized in Sperling. Both passed only on the authority of the trial court to issue notice at all.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482, 486 (1989). Given that a principal concern
regarding notice is the pecuniary motivation of plaintiffs' counsel, any notice should apprise
recipients that they are free to employ the named plaintiffs' counsel, or counsel of their own
choosing.
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hope that those notified will join in the existing litigation, instead of
bringing separate lawsuits against the defendant at other times. 119
Thus a judicial tendency to be overbearing is a potential risk. Yet even
balancing between speech and other legitimate competing interests, 120
the balance weighs in favor of allowing judicial notification. Because
notice would be subject to adversarial probing, and perhaps to further
review,"' sufficient redress would exist for any impropriety.
122
VII. NOTIFICATION, ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY
Resistance to judicial notice to putative plaintiffs rests primarily on
a belief that allowing the judge to intervene or interfere in this way is
inconsistent with the rules of adversarial justice. 123  The litigation
game as traditionally played requires that each opponent try to outfox
the other, with the judge impartially refraining from helping or hin-
dering either side's chances of success. If the judge helps plaintiffs to
notify other persons who might join in, that would increase plaintiffs'
chances either of winning a verdict after trial or extracting a more
favorable settlement. Thus the judge would be helping plaintiffs and
hurting defendants, and, it is argued, that is not how the game is
played.
Another aspect of the game is who gets to play in the first place.
Potential players must determine they have a cause of action against
the defendant, and must take appropriate action before the statute of
119. See M. PETERSON & M. SELVIN, MASS JUSTICE: THE LIMrrED AND UNLIMITED
POWER OF COuRTs 5 (Yale Law School Program in Civil Liability Working Paper No. 123,
1990) ("Faced with mass tort litigation, judges are not simply neutral arbiters but rather they
have strong incentives of their own to speed the judicial process, save costs and labor, and reduce
the redundancy of mass litigation.") (on fie with the Washington Law Review) (forthcoming in
54 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. - (1991)).
120. See eg., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).
121. Interlocutory review might be available under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), as in Sperling, 110 S.
Ct. at 485-86, or review might be had by mandamus, as in Pan Am. World Airways v. United
States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 1975). But see Resnik, supra note 80, at
413-14 (arguing that pre-trial management is significantly more problematic than post-trial
management because of infrequency of appellate oversight).
122. In addition, violations of applicable standards of judicial conduct might form the basis
for sanctions. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(A) (1990) provides that "[a] judge
shall ... act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary."
123. See Pound, supra note 10, at 281-82 ("The idea of [our contentious] procedure... leads
the most conscientious judge to feel that he is merely to decide the contest, as counsel present it,
according to the rules of the game, not to search independently for truth and justice."). My
discussion of the adversary system in this part pertains to its operation only in civil, not criminal
litigation.
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limitations expires. If the statute runs before plaintiff acts, defendant
wins by default. The traditional rules appear to prevent the judge-
the impartial referee-from assisting potential plaintiffs in discovering
the existence of a possible cause of action.' 24 Or, to put it as others
have, courts should not be in the business of waking sleeping
plaintiffs.1 25
The game need not and should not be played that way. The posture
of the judge as passive and neutral may be legitimate when competi-
tors are comparably well-matched and resources ample on both sides.
Truth and justice might prevail if able adversaries are allowed to com-
pete, relatively unhampered. But generalized assumptions about
equality between adversaries or comparability of resources do not
withstand scrutiny.126 We cannot assume that those with legitimate
claims will necessarily know when and how to invoke the judicial
machinery. Many persons who would "sleep through" the statute of
124. The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 altered the rules concerning this aspect of the game to
the extent that if an action is certified as a class action, then the judge has the explicit power to
notify absent class members in the interests ofjustice. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
125. See Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 30 (E.D. La. 1975):
The awakening of sleeping plaintiffs by either the plaintiff or the Court would fly in the teeth
of the centuries-old doctrine against the solicitation of claims. While we sympathize with
the plight of the unascertained number of potential plaintiffs who may be entirely unaware
of their legal rights, we must not put our imprimatur on a procedure designed to stir up
litigation. This statement is made only because we are unaware of any legal precedent or
principle which supports the suggestion that either the plaintiff or the Court has any moral,
legal or ethical duty "to act as unsolicited champions of others."
See Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 936 (D. Mass. 1962) (disallowing notice
in pre-1983 Rule 23 spurious class action as it was not court's "duty to awaken anyone who is
sleeping through the period of limitation set by Congress"); see also Sperling, 110 S. Ct. at 492
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted):
There is more than a little historical irony in the Court's decision today. "Stirring up litiga-
tion" was once exclusively the occupation of disreputable lawyers, roundly condemned by
this and all American Courts.... But in the age of the "case managing" judicial bureau-
cracy, our perceptions have changed. Seeking out and notifying sleeping potential plaintiffs
yields such economies of scale that what was once demeaned as a drain on judicial resources
is now praised as a cutting-edge tool of efficient judicial administration. Perhaps it is. But
that does not justify our taking it in hand when Congress has not authorized it. Even less
does it justify our rush to abandon (not only without compulsion but without invitation)
what the Court deprecatingly calls the courts' "passive" role in determining which claims
come before them, but which I regard as one of the natural components of a system in which
courts are not inquisitors of justice but arbiters of adversarial claims.
126. See Burbank, The Transformation ofAmerican Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1952 (1989) (noting that pure adversary system requires equality of
representation, and that we have in this country no equal access to quality legal representation);
Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 312 (1989)
(noting that adversary theory ignores inequality in resources or skill).
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limitations absent notice, may do so through ignorance, lack of
resources, or both.1
27
There is scant justification for keeping potential plaintiffs in the
dark. 12  Notice fosters informed decisiornmaking. At the core of our
fundamental democratic values, exemplified by the first amendment, is
open communication and shared information. Allowing, perhaps even
encouraging, the judiciary to facilitate notice to interested persons fur-
thers these fundamental values.
127. See Riojas v. Seal Produce, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 613, 619 (1979):
In light of the fact that the [FLA] is meant to aid injured parties in recovering unpaid
minimum wages, it is only sensible that procedures facilitating this intent would be favored.'
This is particularly so in the present case in which there are possibly hundreds of migrant
farm workers who might not ever receive their allegedly unpaid minimum wages. These
farm workers are relatively poor individuals who have received little formal education and
often have no conception of legal rights which they might possess.... In a case such as this
where the alleged class members are migratory and difficult to locate, it is nothing more
than an act of fundamental fairness to allow [notice] ....
Accord Neizil v. Williams, 96 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 34, 328 (M.D. Fla. 1983); see also J.
AUERBACH, supra note 99, at 43 (describing how professional canons prohibiting solicitation and
advertising penalized less sophisticated potential clients).
In addition to the problem that those who are uninformed and unsophisticated might fail to
act on their claims in a timely manner, is the very real concern that such people might be per-
suaded to settle for far less than they could otherwise recover. See, ag., G. STERN, THE BuF-
FALO CREEK DisAsTER 21-22 (1976) (describing mining company's attempts to persuade
victims of mining disaster to settle without consulting counsel).
128. It is unlikely that judicially-facilitated notice will result in any glut of litigation, tort or
otherwise, in federal courts that would otherwise be resolved by the state courts. See Galanter,
The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L.
REv. 921. Galanter demonstrates that federal tort filings have shown marginal growth when
compared to other kinds of filings since 1960. Id. at 925. They represented 16.5% less of the
total civil filings in 1986 than in 1960. Id at 936. In addition, the most significant mass of tort
filings in federal court are product liability cases. By 1985, product liability filings represented
31.5% of all tort filings. Id at 937. The increase in product liability filings was 30 times that of
other tort filings from 1974 to 1985 (1579 to 13,554 as compared to 22,551 to 28,296). Id
Product liability cases make up a much greater proportion of the tort docket in federal court
than in state court. For example, in Florida in 1986, product liability cases were 2.3% of all tort
filings in the state, compared to 29.7% of the federal tort filings. Id at 938. Furthermore,
episodic toxic torts comprise a large percentage of the product liability cases. In 1986, for
example, asbestos cases comprised 43% of all product liability cases in federal court. Id at 939.
As Galanter suggests, "[tihis pool is destined to diminish over the coming decades-due first to
the deadly effects of asbestos and second to powerful preventive effects produced by the asbestos
litigation." Id at 939-40. Thus a substantial bulk of federal tort cases currently are of mass tort
nature. Despite general displeasure with diversity jurisdiction, federal courts manifest little or no
antipathy to assertions of jurisdiction over mass torts. See J. Resnik, supra note 18, at 105-06.
As Professor Resnik asserts, "it seems 'unnatural' to think about not using the federal courts as
the place for mass tort litigation." Id at 111. Whatever increase in federal litigation judicial
facilitation of notice might cause would likely be more than offset by the total cost savings in
combined state and federal litigation.
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We should improve upon our adversary system for the sake of pub-
lic, as well as private, interests. 129 The greater the number of affected
parties, the greater the potential public interest in what might other-
wise be deemed a private matter. For example, the creation of statu-
tory causes of action for age discrimination in employment claims
bespeaks a public interest in eradicating discrimination based on
age. 130 Concern for social justice supports the legitimacy of assisting
those who may be unaware of their constitutional and statutory
rights.131 The medical, economic, and social costs of mass exposure to
substances such as asbestos create a public interest in the collective
pursuit of tort claims brought against manufacturers of these sub-
stances. 32 Air safety is another example of a public interest that can
be promoted by resolving private claims arising from airplane disas-
ters. The story of the aftermath of the 1972 coal mining disaster in
Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, underscores the value of private, mass
joinder litigation in publicizing and rectifying egregious environmental
and occupational safety violations.133
Increasingly, to ease case management, courts are certifying claims
arising from mass torts as Rule 23 class actions. 34 Rule 23 provides
for notice in class actions arising under it.135 The Supreme Court has
held that for the purposes of opt-in class actions arising under the
FLSA and the ADEA, courts have the right to authorize notice to
129. See Rubin, The Managed Calendar: Some Pragmatic Suggestions About Achieving the
Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 JusT. Sys. J. 135,
136, 140 (1978) (judge is representative of the public interest in matters of judicial system
utilization); Yamamoto, supra note 1, at 401 (asserting protection of public rights as function of
adjudication).
130. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988) (as
amended).
131. Cf. Kaplan, supra note 61, at 397-98 (arguing for opt-out, as opposed to opt-in class
provisions, since many recipients of notice "for one reason or another, ignorance, timidity,
unfamiliarity with business or legal matters, will simply not take the affirmative step. The moral
justification for treating such people as null quantities is questionable").
132. See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases A "Public Law" Vision
of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. RaV. 849, 900 n.186 (1984) ("Court-ordered notification of
potential victims not only would permit aggregation of claims, but also would reduce the overall
cost of accidents by enabling victims to receive diagnosis and treatment at an earlier stage of the
disease caused by their exposure.").
133. See generally G. STERN, supra note 127.
134. See J. Resnik, supra note 18, at 84:
When faced with mass torts, some judicial hostility to class actions melts, as the class action
becomes perceived more as a management tool than as a vehicle for political empowerment
.... [T]he class action ran be viewed and used less as a means of access than as a way to
conserve judicial resources in response to the existence of many lawsuits making similar
claims.
135. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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potential class mdmbers. 136  The distinctions between mass joinders
and class actions have begun to blur. 137 There is no legitimate reason
for treating these two categories of complex litigation differently for
purposes of the court's power to send notice.
To the extent that defendants may have limited resources to pay
claims against them, there is a public interest in insuring that the vin-
dication of private rights do not depend on the serendipity of who is
able to perfect a judgement first against a defendant. 131 Consolidation
of claims would assuage these concerns, through resolution of multiple
claims against a defendant arising from a single act or series of related
acts.
Furthermore, litigation is a substantial drain bn public as well as
private resources. 139 At a time when we face an enormous national
budget deficit, we ought to embrace measures that conserve public
resources wherever feasible.1" Consolidation is a cost effective tool
for resolving multiple claims.
Notification would facilitate consolidation. Admittedly, it would
not guarantee consolidation, and thus is only a partial solution to the
problems raised. I refrain from advocating a more radical approach of
requiring potential plaintiffs to participate in pending litigation or risk
136. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
137. See J. Resnik, supra note 18, at 98-104.
138. This is the rationale supporting the "limited fund" class action. See Trangsrund, Joinder
Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 784 (1985) (arguing that "limited
fund class action is appropriate only when the prosecution of separate tort claims creates a
significant risk that damage recoveries by some individual plaintiffs will 'substantially impair or
impede' the ability of others to secure collectable judgments."); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee's notes (1966) (judgment in limited fund class action does not preclude claims of
nonappearing members).
139. See Miller, supra note 76, at 22 (describing consumption of public resources by dilatory
litigation tactics).
140. Certainly this was a motivating factor in the 1983 amendments to the federal Rules. See,
e-g., a at 29-30:
[Rules 16 and 26] represent an explicit wrench or departure from the traditional adversary
model-the historic notion that cases ought to be handled by attorneys for their clients as
they think best, at whatever speed, using whatever procedures, settling or not settling as
they see best. But what rules 16 and 26 do formally is not a tremendous wrench with actual
practice; it is simply a formalization of a process of moving from a pure adversary theory of
litigation to a shared power relationship between counsel and the bench. The bench now, in
a sense, representing the public, is saying you are invoking a public resource. Society has
the right to participate in the decision-making process as to how this case is to be handled.
It is no longer true that cases are lawyers' cases. There is a triangulated relationship here.
Now that may-over time, through attrition and just change in the nature of the bench and
in the nature of the bar-represent a very dramatic shift from what we have for a thousand
years called the adversary model. I don't know whether that is good; I don't know whether
it is bad, all I know is that it is potentially a very high stakes poker game.
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forfeiting their claims."' Notifying persons of pending litigation
merely provides an opportunity for the resolution of all disputes aris-
ing from a given set of events. It does not guarantee success. Some
may choose to bring their claims in other courts, at other times.
Others who might have slept on their claims until the passage of the
statute of limitations, and now awake to their rights, may bring suit in
another court. 42 Nonetheless, joinder offers so many advantages to
141. Presently, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988), permits the trial court to consolidate proceedings
filed in federal court, but only for purposes of pretrial proceedings. Recent recommendations of
the Federal Courts Study Committee would have Congress amend § 1407(a) to require
consolidation also for trial, and provide for minimum diversity. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, April 2, 1990, at 44-45; see also H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 4(i)(1), 135 CONG. REc. 6659 (1989) (related to H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG.
REc. H4232 (1988)) (the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989, permitting transferee
courts to retain jurisdiction through liability phase of trial of mass tort cases transferred under
the Act). But see Trangsrund, supra note 138, at 816-24 (opposing mandatory consolidation of
mass tort cases).
The American Law Institute (ALl) Complex Litigation Project has put forth a more radical
approach. See COMPLEX LrrIGATION PROJECT § 5.05 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1990). It proposes a
statute that would empower a court to notify nonparties who may have a claim "involv[ing] one
or more questions of law or fact in common with the actions pending before the transferee court
and aris[ing] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences"
that they may intervene in an action pending before the court and that whether or not they
intervene, they "will be bound by the determinations made to the same extent as a party to that
action." Id. at 97. Considerations include whether "[i]ntervention will advance the efficient,
consistent, and final resolution of asserted and unasserted claims; and ... will not impose upon
either the nonparties or existing parties undue prejudice, burden, or inconvenience. The effect of
this proposal would be to increase the advantages of mandatory consolidation by affording issue-
preclusive effect to the determination of the transferee forum not only as to existing litigants, but
to potential litigants with mature yet unfiled claims. Chapter 5 of Tentative Draft No. 2 was
approved provisionally at the ALI Annual Meeting in May, 1990, subject to reexamination in
relationship to other Project chapters yet to be drafted. 12 ALI REP. 3 (1990).
The ABA Comm'n on Mass Torts, Revised Final Report and Recommendations (Nov. 1989)
takes yet another approach. It would discourage "fence-sitting" on fully matured yet unfiled
claims by limiting punitive damages and precluding use of the judgment obtained in the
consolidated litigation for plaintiff's advantage. Id. §§ 110, 112(a). This latter provision is
largely a codification of the Parklane rule regarding offensive collateral estoppel. See supra note
87. The provision would not apply if plaintiff had no timely notice of the consolidated litigation,
and the Commission's proposed legislation is silent on whether the trial court can notify persons
having matured yet unfiled claims. ABA Comm'n on Mass Torts, supra, § 112(b)(1).
142. This is, however, unlikely to be a significant problem. Those sophisticated enough to
choose another forum would likely have brought suit elsewhere in any event. Such notice then is
unlikely to result in an increase in satellite litigation, and is probably more likely to effectuate
greater consolidation. See Johnson v. American Airlines 531 F. Supp. 957, 960 n.1 (N.D. Tex.
1982):
Assuming American is correct in its assertion that the Plaintiffs herein are well educated
flight officers, and hence by their status are more likely to be aware of their legal rights and
opportunities to litigate under the ADEA, then the fear of multiple lawsuits becomes all the
more real and compelling.
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potential plaintiffs that the possibility of a single forum for resolution
of all aspects of a single wrong is greatly enhanced. 43
It is important to acknowledge that the statute of limitations serves
important functions and is not merely a ploy in the adversary game.'"
The statute fosters repose. It provides the security of knowing that
after the passage of a given time, we no longer need fear that a particu-
lar legal problem will haunt us. Individuals and institutions alike are
entitled to the certainty of some statutory period so that they may go
about their affairs with reasonable predictability. Furthermore, stale
claims invite stale proof.
Yet it is primarily the gamesmanship aspect of the statute of limita-
tions that is likely to be lost if judges are empowered to notify putative
plaintiffs. The statute of limitations will no longer be a period defend-
ant must endure, after which it will be safe from suit. If other plain-
tiffs choose to opt-in to the pending litigation, their claims should
relate back to the original filing. 145 The legitimate justifications for the
statute will be preserved: the initial suit will apprise defendants of the
143. See Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (authorizing
notice to potential plaintiffs in ADEA opt-in class action):
Moreover, it is already apparent that a number of other present and former employees are
contemplating filing separate actions. In the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, it
is desirable to minimize the number of such separate actions and to coordinate the
discovery, at least on the issue of liability. Notice of this action should contribute
substantially to that end.
144. See supra text accompanying note 124.
145. This would be subject to any statute of limitations problem or other bar that would have
prevented the opting-in party from pursuing his claim when the original complaint was filed.
See, eg., Johnson, 531 F. Supp. at 963 (holding that only persons who would have been able to
timely satisfy ADEA filing requirements as of date named plaintiff filed charge could opt-in to
class). This approach is consistent with the treatment of the filing requirement in Title VII class
actions, see, eg., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496,499 (5th Cir. 1968), as well as with the thrust of FED. R. Civ. P.
15(c) regarding relation back of amendments to the pleadings. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory
committee notes:
The relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs is not expressly treated in revised Rule
15(c) since the problem is generally easier. Again the chief consideration of policy is that of
the statute of limitations, and the attitude taken in revised Rule 15(c) toward change of
defendants extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs.
See also United States v. Cook, 795 F.2d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (upholding discovery of names
of putative plaintiffs and refusing to address statute of limitations defense regarding such persons
in absence of specific case or controversy).
In order to insure that the defendant not be unfairly surprised, the complaint, presumably filed
within the statute of limitations should allege its class or collective nature. Cf Lusardi v. Lech-
ner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1078 (3d Cir. 1988); Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.
1986); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir. 1980); Bean v. Crocker Nat'l
Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 759-60 (9th Cir. 1979) (prerequisite of filing with EEOC within 180 or 300
days of filing suit for discriminatory act satisfied if one claimant filed within statutory period on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated). But cf McCorstin v. United States Steel
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nature of the claims against them, and there will be little risk that
necessary evidence will become stale or witnesses more difficult to
locate. 146
A number of other issues remain. If judges are given the power to
facilitate notice to putative plaintiffs of pending litigation, what range
of discretion should they have? Should it be within the judge's discre-
tion to send the notice on court letterhead, or to authorize plaintiffs'
counsel to send it?147 Who should bear the cost of notice?148 Should
the potential benefit to plaintiffs' counsel weigh in the balance?149 How
much discretion should the court have to refuse to issue notice to or
allow discovery of potential plaintiffs? 5' Should the answer to any of
Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755-56 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff precluded from proceeding as an ADEA
class action when other employees did not file timely charge themselves).
146. In Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971), the court of appeals upheld the trial court's post-judgment notice to persons who were
similarly situated to the plaintiff airline stewardesses. Id. at 1201. Although the court had never
certified the case as a class action, it found that the sex discrimination violation of Title VII was
of a class nature. Id. at 1201-02. By inviting putative class members to submit claims for
resolution in the remedy phase of the suit, the court ignored any statute of limitations problems.
See also Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1961), cert
dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962) (allowing absent plaintiffs to submit claims for damages after
interlocutory finding of defendants' liability). Given that a defendant may litigate a lawsuit with
less vigor if it were not originally tried as a class action, such an order would likely have a far
greater adverse impact on a defendant than notification to putative plaintiffs pre-trial is likely to
have.
147. See Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1982) (Eschbach, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
148. See MCL, supra note 13, § 1.45. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176
(1974), the Court required plaintiffs to bear the costs in the first instance, subject to recovery
should they prevail. Several federal district courts have adopted the Eisen rule, see, ag., D. KAN.
R. 209(d); M.D.N.C.R. 212(d). Interestingly, neither counsel, nor any of the courts adjudicating
the Sperling notice issue, addressed the question of costs.
149. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 486 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that given pecuniary motive of attorney in mailing solicitations to persons known to
have specific legal problems, the tendency towards corruption that ensues substantiates
overriding governmental interest in prohibition). In Sperling, petitioner argued that the interest
of plaintiffs' lawyers in notifying putative plaintiffs was "the maximization of money damage
claims as leverage for extracting favorable settlements and to maximize the potential counsel fee
award." Brief for Petitioner at 15, Hoffman-La Roche v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989) (No. 88-
1203). The Court did not address this issue.
150. In particular cases, joinder of putative plaintiffs might be inappropriate. See FCSC
Report, supra note 14, at 45 ("Consolidation . . . is not always desirable. It may not be
economical, and trial on liability issues alone may skew results. Thus, while it is important to
make consolidation possible for cases in which it could be desirable, guidelines for its use could
reduce its misapplication when consolidation might be inappropriate.") The Committee
recommended that such guidelines be published either by the Board of Editors of the MCL, or as
part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
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these questions depend on the preferences of parties or their
attorneys?1
5i
Because notice furthers information, access, and efficiency, the court
should bear a heavy burden to justify a decision not to facilitate notice
when requested by either party to do so. In general, the cost of notice
should be born by the party who desires to send it. Costs of discovery
of the names and addresses of potential parties Should be born as they
would be for other discovery. If plaintiff desires to send notice, plain-
tiff should bear the costs of printing and mailing. 152 If the cost of
individual notice would be prohibitive, then plaintiff should consider
feasible alternatives, such as notice by publication, or public
posting. 153
If it is the court rather than either party that desires to send notice,
the court should consider infringements on party autonomy and fair-
ness. If the court concludes that the public benefits of notice outweigh
the private burdens on the existing parties, then it would be appropri-
ate for the court to bear the cost of notice. 54
Undoubtedly, other questions about notice will arise. Our judicial
system is moving appropriately towards decreasing transactional costs
of litigation through consolidation of appropriate cases and enhance-
ment of managerial techniques.1 55 A commitment in principle to the
propriety of judicially facilitated notice furthers that trend.1 56 Experi-
ence will help address the secondary questions notice raises.
151. See In re Air Crash Disaster 549 F.2d 1006, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1977) (court may
consolidate cases and designate lead counsel over parties' or their counsel's objections).
152. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178 ("The usual rule is that a plaintiff must initially bear the cost
of notice to the class.").
153. For the kind of mass joinder actions this article addresses, there are no Rule 23 or due
process requirements for "best notice practiqable" as there was in Eisen. See supra text
accompanying notes 83-88. If the number of affected persons would be prohibitively large, such
as in the asbestos litigation, then the "joinder of all members is [likely] impracticable." FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
154. Certainly, plaintiff should not be saddled with costs to expand the litigation. It is clear
from Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-79, that the Court would find it inappropriate to require defendant
to undertake these expenses, at least before any finding of liability. If the trial court concludes
that fostering consolidation through notice is likely to conserve judicial resources, then it is
appropriate for the judicial system to absorb the costs.
155. See supra notes 12-15, 76-81 and accompanying text.
156. While I believe the Supreme Court will reach the same conclusion when faced with the
appropriate vehicle--be it case specific, or as an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-I would certainly welcome congressional expedition. For example, the Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1990, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 1st Sess, 135 CONG. REc. H6659,
passed the House on June 1, 1990, but failed to gain Senate approval. This Bill provided that
"any person with a claim arising from the event or occurrence described in subsection (a) shall be
permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff in the action," iad § 1367(c), but it was silent on the
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling, the Supreme Court allowed the
umpire to notify some sleeping players that the game was under way.
It made good sense for the Court to do so. Although due process does
not require that persons potentially interested in complex litigation
other than Rule 23 class actions receive such notice, notice fosters
important public policy interests and is suggested and legitimated by
first amendment values. The Article III judge does not overstep con-
stitutional bounds by apprising such persons that litigation they might
want to join is proceeding. Not only is such power consistent with the
evolving tools of judicial management of litigation, the absence of such
power in complex litigation undermines efforts to improve the efficacy,
efficiency and accessibility of the judicial system. It is time to put old
saws about champertous lawyers and sleeping plaintiffs to rest.
question of notice to such persons. This legislation would be an appropriate vehicle for
explicating the courts' power to notify interested persons of complex litigation.
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